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Abstract 
In this paper, a coalition formation based negotiation protocol, which aims to reduce the workload and time of the manufacturer 
agent (MA), is proposed for the material supplier agent (MSA) to find partners to establish a coalition when the order is out of its 
ability. Concessions among the multi-attribute are considered by MA and MSAs to tradeoff the multi-attribute according to their 
preferences. Stackelberg game is introduced to find the equilibrium of the multi-item multi-attribute negotiation. The feasibility and 
effectiveness of the proposed protocol are verified by computational experiments. 
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1. Introduction 
Both multi-attribute negotiation (Bichler [1], Kim etal. 
[2], Lai and Sycara [3], Hindriks et al. [4], and Park and 
Yang [5]) and multi-item negotiation (Lengwiler [6], 
Benameur et al. [7], Shi and Hu [8], and Bush and 
Horstmman [9]) are crucial for the negotiation of the 
supply chain networks (SCNs). Since manufacturer 
agents (MAs) have their own preferences for the 
attributes of the products, and they are looking for the 
offer that best satisfies these preferences (Bichler [1]). 
On the other hand, they need to buy multi-item to 
produce their products, and need to negotiate with 
material supplier agents (MSAs). The MSAs in market 
consist of large companies as well as a large number of 
small and medium sized enterprises. Thus, MAs may 
need to negotiate and find a large number of MSAs to 
fulfill their orders due to the large number of items and 
quantities of their orders and the limited abilities of the 
MSAs. It will be a hard work for the MAs to split their 
orders into pieces and allocate to the different MSAs 
when there are diversity items to buy, and it also causes 
a lot of external fee (e.g. transport cost). Thus, the MAs 
would like to select the MSAs with low price and high 
ability to reduce their costs. As a result, the MAs may 
have to give up the MSAs with the lowest prices but 
limited abilities, and these MSAs may lose a lot of 
opportunities to compete for the profitable orders. 
Therefore, this research tries to find a way to solve this 
problem by letting the MSAs make a coalition. There are 
many works that focus on the coalition formation among 
the buyers (He et al. [10]), but few papers focus on the 
formation of suppliers (Stuart [11]).   
The multi-item multi-attribute negotiation is 
discussed in this research, where the MA in the proposed 
model has more negotiation power and the MSAs are 
allowed to establish coalitions when the order is out of 
their abilities. Three attributes, which mutually 
constrained each other, are considered in this research. 
Stackelberg game is adopted to find the equilibrium of 
the negotiation. A coalition formation based negotiation 
protocol is -win 
protocol for both MA and MSAs. It can reduce 
workload, time and cost for MA, and provide more 
opportunities for MSAs to get orders. It can increase the 
competitiveness of the market as well.  
2. Model 
Considering the negotiation between one 
manufacturer agent (MA) and J material supplier agents 
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(MSAs), three attributes (price, quantity, and lead time), 
and K items are involved. Single-item single-attribute 
negotiations between one MA and multi-MSA and 
between multi-MA and multi-MSA have been discussed 
in Yu et al. [12] and Yu et al. [13], respectively. 
However, both of them assumed that only one item is 
ordered by the MA(s). In this research, the results are 
generalized to more common situation that MA wants to 
buy multi-item at the same time and it wants to 
maximally keep the integrity of the order. The 
negotiation model is shown in Fig.1, in which a car 
company (defined as MA) is taken as an example. The 
MA wants to buy K items (glasses, tiers, bearings and so 
on) from the MSAs, and the attributes of each item are 
defined as a triple (PM, Q, LT). We can see that the 
determination of the quantity Q of MA depends on the 
demand of the market, and the demand of the market is 
affected by the price PM of MA.  The MSAs try to find 
partners to establish coalitions when the order of MA is 
out of their abilities (the dotted arrows among MSAs 
indicate the negotiations to establish coalitions).  
 Nomenclature: 
           percentage of profit of MA 
jk          productivity of item k of MSA j 
k                proportion of item k 
            concession function 
            profit of MA or MSA 
Ajk          ability of item k of MSA j 
ACjlk      ability of sjl    
Cjk         cost of item k of MSA j 
clt          cost of saving or extending lead time 
D           demand of the final product 
DK        demand of item k 
LT          lead time  
P            price of the item 
Q           quantity of the item 
QS       acquired quantity of MSA  in coalition sjl 
sjl           lth coalition of MSA j 
sv          salvage value of unsold product 
Superscripts M, S and C are used to show the 
differences of the strategies of MA, MSA, and coalition, 
respectively. The subscripts j, k, and l indicate the 
related MSA, item and coalition, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Multi-item multi-attribute negotiation model 
3. Coalition formation based negotiation protocol 
In this research, we assume that the MSAs are 
allowed to find partners to establish coalitions when the 
order of MA is out of their abilities. The coalition 
formation for single-item negotiation has been discussed 
in Yu et al. [12, 13]. The situation will be much more 
complex if multiple items are involved. E = [ejk] is a 
matrix used to record the abilities of the MSAs means 
MSA j is out of ability of item k (Ajk  < Qk) and in that 
case MSA j will try to establish a coalition which can 
maximize its profit. 
The MSA, which triggers the negotiation, is called as 
leader-MSA (LMSA), and the others that agree to form a 
coalition are called as follower-MSAs (FMSA).  
3.1. Coalition formation based negotiation protocol 
The coalition formation based negotiation protocol is 
proposed as follows and the flowchart of the protocol is 
shown in Fig.2. 
 Step 1: MA calculates market demand and 
determines its strategies as (1)  (3) and broadcasts to all 
MSAs. 
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where (1) - (3) are respectively used to calculate the 
price, quantity and lead time of the MA. We assume that 
the lead time for MA is the shorter, the better. PkMU is 
the upper bound of the price of item k of the MA, and 
the functions  are piecewise functions used to calculate 
the concessions among the attributes in the form of (4). 
xy
z(y) means the concession rate of the attribute x 
related to the attribute y, z equals to M and S, yg and gxy 
are related threshold values. DKjk[t] is the demand of the 
item k at t, and it is in proportion to the demand of the 
end product at t ( kDj[t the MA it is 
impossible to evaluate the demand of each item directly, 
and it only can forecast the demand related to the final 
product. However, the MA knows the proportion of each 
item of each product. 
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Fig. 2. Coalition formation based negotiation protocol 
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It is assumed that the demand of the product, which is 
calculated by (5), is in an additive form. a and b are 
related coefficients of the demand. PjM[t] is the final 
price of the end product and is calculated by (6).  
Step 2: The MSAs evaluate the order to check 
whether the order is in their abilities or not, and the 
abilities of the MSAs at t are calculated by (7).  
 
kjtLTtA Mjjkjk ,],[][                                        (7) 
 
If the order is in their abilities, go to Step 4, and if the 
order is out of their abilities, then go to Step 3. 
Step 3: The MSAs try to find coalitions, which can 
maximize their profits at t (see section 3.2). 
Step 4: The MSAs determine their strategies as (8)  
(10) and go to Step5. 
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where (8)  (10) are respectively used to calculate the 
price, quantity and lead time of the MSAs, and all the 
functions  are piecewise functions used to calculate the 
concessions among the attributes. We assume that for 
the MSAs the lead time is the longer, the better. QjkSL is 
the lower bound quantity of MSA j of item k to ensure 
the order is profitable. PjkSU and PjkSL are the upper 
bound and lower bound of the price of the item k of 
MSA j. 
Step 5: MA negotiates with the MSAs (coalitions) to 
determine the equilibriums (see section 4), if the 
equilibriums are found, go to Step 7, and if they are not 
found yet, then go to Step 6. 
Step 6: Check whether the terminal condition is 
reached or not. If it is not reached, go back to Step 4 and 
the negotiation repeats until an agreement is reached or 
the terminal condition is reached; if it is reached, then 
the negotiation ends, and failed to reach an agreement.  
Step 7: MA determines the final supplier according to 
these equilibriums and the negotiations end. 
3.2. Dynamic coalition formation mechanism 
In this section, the dynamic coalition formation 
mechanism among MSAs is discussed. 
3.2.1. Dynamic searching of all possible coalitions 
The searching for all possible coalitions of single-
item negotiation has been discussed in Yu et al. [12-13]. 
However, the coalition may become out of ability after 
the negotiation starts, because the searching for coalition 
is only done at the initial step. It will not be suitable for 
the multi-attribute negotiation, for the lead time and 
quantity may be changed after several iterations, and the 
ability of the initial determined coalition will change as 
well. Therefore, a dynamic searching of all possible 
coalitions will be discussed in this section. The MSAs, 
which are out of abilities, try to update their coalitions 
according to the strategies of the MA at each negotiation 
iteration t. Following assumptions and rule are given for 
the MSAs to judge whether to accept to establish a 
coalition or not. 
Assumption 1: If more than one LMSA invites MSA 
j to establish a partnership, then MSA j accepts the order 
with the highest profit. 
Assumption 2: If more than one FMSA agrees to 
establish partnerships, then MSA j selects the FMSA 
with the lowest price. 
Assumption 3: The coalition can be established if and 
only if all the members in the coalition are profitable. 
It is said to be profitable for the MSAs if the profits of 
finishing the acquired parts of the order is greater than 
their minimum expected profits.  
Rule:  If the order is out of ability of FMSA, the 
FMSA accepts to establish a coalition if and only if (iff) 
the profit of belonging to the coalition is profitable; 
otherwise it accepts to establish a coalition iff the profit 
In ability 
N 
MSAs evaluate the order 
k=1 
Exist? 
Determined their 
strategies 
k=K 
k++ 
Y 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
Stackelberg game based multi-
attribute negotiation 
Find equilibrium 
Determine the final supplier 
Y 
Start t=0 
MA determines its 
strategy 
t++ 
Dynamic coalition 
formation 
Reject 
the order 
End  
 t=TN/TS 
N 
N 
Y 
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of belonging to the coalition is greater than that of 
completing by itself. 
3.2.2. Dynamic coalition determination 
  At each negotiation iteration t, the coalition SCj[t] 
which maximizes the profit of the LMSA will be 
determined as the final coalition by solving following 
problem:  
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where (11) is used to calculate the profit of the coalition 
sjl at t, QSjlk[t] is the acquired quantity of MSA j in sjl at t 
and is calculated by (13), and (12) is used to ensure that 
the coalition is in ability of each item of the order at t. 
The attention should be paid to that it is allowed that the 
member of the coalition is a coalition. In that case,  in 
(12) and (13) may be a coalition. The strategies of the 
coalitions are defined as  
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where Njlk[t] is the number of MSAs in sjl[t] can supply 
item k, and (14) means the price of item k of sjl[t] equals 
to the average price of all its members which supply 
item k. (15) and (16) are used to calculate the quantity 
and lead time of item k of sjl[t]. 
3.3. Profit allocation 
Another important issue of the coalition formation is 
how to allocate the profit among its members after the 
coalition is determined. For the single-attribute 
negotiation, the profit was allocated according to the 
contributions to the coalition, and was finally reduce to 
the allocation of the quantity of the order. However, in 
the multi-attribute negotiation, the profit is evaluated 
according to all the attributes. Therefore, the profit of the 
coalition must be allocated according to all the attributes 
of its members. Thus, the profit of each member j in sjl[t] 
is calculated by 
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where the first part of (17) is the payment of MSA j 
received from the coalition, the second part is the cost of 
MSA j to supply the received part, and the last part is the 
profit or loss of extending or reducing the lead time. 
4. Equilibrium of the negotiation  
The determination of the final equilibrium of the 
multi-item multi-attribute negotiation is discussed in this 
section. As we have assumed that the MA in the 
proposed model has initiative and more negotiation 
power. It firstly announces its strategies, and then the 
MSAs or coalitions react by playing the best moves 
based on the strategies of the MA. Both MA and MSA j 
(SCj[t]) want to maximize their profits by choosing their 
preferential strategies. The MA aims to determine the 
strategies as lower as possible to maximize its profit, 
while MSA j (SCj[t]) wants to get the strategies the 
higher, the better. Thus, there exists a conflict of the 
interests of the two sides. The key point is to find a 
balance between the profits of MA and MSA j (SCj[t]). 
The interaction between MA and MSA j (SCj[t])  can be 
modeled as a MA-Stackelberg game, where MA is the 
leader. The objective of the leader is to design its move 
to maximize its profit after considering all rational 
moves the follower may devise. Therefore, the problem 
is transformed into finding the Stackelberg equilibrium 
of MA-Stackelberg game. 
As we know, in the single-attribute negotiation, the 
equilibrium is determined just depends on the price of 
the item. However, all the attributes should be taken into 
account in the multi-attribute negotiation in order to 
evaluate the strategies. Thus, we evaluate the strategies 
of MA as (18) and provide the evaluation for MSAs as 
(19) as well. 
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where (18) calculates the profit of MA related to all the 
attributes, the first part is the revenue of the sold 
products, the second part is the payment it should pay 
for the MSA, the third part is the salvage value of over 
ordered products, and the last part is the profit or loss of 
saving or extending the lead time of MA. Equation (19) 
calculates the profit of MSA j (SCj[t]) of taking the 
strategies of MA, and the first part is to calculate the net 
profit of the sold products, and the second part is the 
profit or loss of saving or extending the lead time for 
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SCj[t]. When the negotiation is between MA and MSA j, 
sjl[t] only contains MSA j, and QSjlk[t] equals to QjkM [t]. 
Then, the equilibrium can be determined by 
maximizing the profit jM[t] of MA and the final 
determined strategies must be accepted by MSA j 
(SCj[t]) as well. Thus, the problem will reduce to find 
the solution of the following problem: 
 
ljtMj ,],[max                                                   (20) 
][',][.. '' tsjtts jl
Min
j
SC
lj
                                       (21) 
 
where jSC[t] is the profit of MSA j of belonging to 
SCj[t], (21) indicates the constraint for MSA j to decide 
whether accept the order or not. When MSA j can finish 
the order by itself jSC[t] will equal to jS[t] and sjl[t] will 
only contain MSA j. However, when MSA j cannot 
finish the order by itself, (21) means all the members of 
coalition sjl[t] should be profitable.  
   After MA finds all the equilibriums between all the 
MSAs or coalitions, it selects the supplier which can 
maximize its profit. 
5. Simulations 
Simulations are provided in this section to imitate the 
multi-item multi-attribute negotiation based on the 
proposed protocol. We assume there is one MA and six 
MSAs in the SCNs and four items are involved in the 
negotiation. The experimental parameters are presented 
in Table 1, and =0.5, 1=6, 2=3, 3=1, 4=2, TN=60, 
TS=1, and clt=100. 
Table 1. Experimental parameters 
 
MSA  
Item 
1 2 3 4 
C  C  C  C 
1 500 1.5 0 0 200 5 0 0 
2 0 0 350 10 0 0 0 0 
3 350 1.7 200 12 150 5.5 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 220 4.9 200 80 
5 250 1.65 200 10.5 100 5.1 100 90 
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 75 
 
After simulation, MA gets all the profits by selecting 
the equilibriums related to MSAs or coalitions. MA gets 
the highest profit by selecting {214}. {214} indicates the 
coalition consists of MSA 2, MSA 1 and MSA 4. 
Therefore, the final supplier of MA is decided as {214} 
and the related profits of MA and {214} is shown in 
Table 2, where FS is the final determined supplier, M is 
the profit of MA of selecting {214}, C is the profit of 
{214}, jSC is the profit of MSA j of belonging to {214}, 
and Min is the minimum required profit of the related 
MSAs in {214}. Thus, we can see from Table 2 that the 
profit of MA of selecting {214} equals to 3,702,644,016, 
and the profit of {214} equals to 71,947.4. According to 
(21), we can see that the equilibrium can be reached iff 
all the members in the coalition are profitable. Thus, we 
check the profits of all the members of {214}. We can 
see from the fourth column and fifth column of Table 2 
that the profits of MSA 2, MSA 1, and MSA 4 of 
belonging to {214} equal to 17,323, 2,522, and 52,102, 
respectively. All of them are greater than the minimum 
expected profits of the MSAs in {214}. Therefore, we 
can see that the MSAs in {214} reach an agreement, and 
the final iteration of the negotiation to reach the 
equilibrium equals to 6.   
Table 2. Final supplier of MA and related profits 
FS M[6] C[6] j jSC[6] MIN 
{214} 3,702,644,016 71,947 2 
1 
4 
17,323 
2,522 
52,102 
2,250.3 
2,184 
2,204.8 
 
Next, we take coalition {214} as an example to show 
how to find the equilibrium during the negotiation. The 
profits of all members of {214} are shown in Fig.3, 
where 1Min = 2,184, 2Min = 2,250.3 and 4Min = 2,204.8 
are the minimum expected profits of MSA 1, MSA 2 and 
MSA 4, respectively. The equilibrium can be reached iff 
the profits of all the members are greater than 1Min, 2Min 
and 4Min according to assumption 3. We can see that 
both the profits of MSA 2 ( 2SC[4] = 6,727) and MSA 4 
( 4SC[4] = 4,857) at t = 4 are greater than their minimum 
expected profits, but 1SC[4] = -1,461 is greatly smaller 
than MSA 1 s expected profit. Therefore, the negotiation 
goes by and when t = 6 all the profits of MSA 1 ( 1SC[6] 
= 2,522), MSA 2 ( 2SC[6] = 17,323), and MSA 4 ( 4SC[6] 
= 52,102) are greater than their minimum expected 
profits. Therefore, negotiation between MA and {214} 
reach equilibrium at t = 6. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Profits of all the members of {214} during the iteration 
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Fig. 4. Multi-attribute negotiation between MA and {214} 
Finally, the iteration of the multi-item multi-attribute 
negotiation is shown in Fig.4 (Take the coalition {214} 
as an example). The final equilibrium is reached at t = 6, 
where the prices of the items are (1.03, 11.04, 5.89, 
88.31), the quantities of the items are (16,720, 10,032, 
3,344, 6,688), and the lead times of the items are (95, 71, 
59, 71). We can see from Fig.4 that the equilibrium is 
 
 by 
selecting their most profitable strategies, and the final 
equilibrium is evaluated not only by one attribute, but on 
all the three attributes. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, multi-item multi-attribute negotiation 
between multi-MA and multi-MSA was discussed. A 
coalition formation based negotiation protocol, which 
aims to reduce the workload and time of the MA, is 
proposed for the MSAs to find partners to establish 
coalitions when the order is out of their abilities.  The 
main difference with the previous work is the coalition is 
time of the order changes at each step, and that will 
reduce to the changes of the abilities of the MSAs. 
Therefore, dynamic coalition formation is proposed in 
order to avoid the situation that the coalition which is in 
ability at the start of the negotiation becomes out of 
ability after the negotiation. Stackelberg game is 
introduced to find the equilibrium of the negotiation 
between MA and MSA or coalition. Concessions among 
the multi-attribute are considered for MA and MSAs to 
tradeoff multi-attribute according to their preferences.  
Finally, MA decides its supplier by selecting the MSA or 
coalition, with which it has the highest profit.  
In this research, only one MA was considered for 
simplifying. In the next step, we will try to extend our 
research to the multi-item multi-attribute negotiation 
between multi-MA and multi-MSA. The performance of 
the proposed protocol will be discussed in the future 
work. Furthermore, it is assumed that the MA has more 
negotiation power in this research, and we will try to 
check what will happen if the MSAs have more 
negotiation powers or what will happen if MA has the 
same negotiation power with the MSAs.  
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